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We assess the severity of phishing attacks in terms of 
their risk levels and the potential loss in market value 
to the firms. We analyze 1,030 phishing alerts 
released on a public database as well as financial data 
related to the targeted firms using a hybrid text and 
data mining method that predicts the severity of the 
attack with high accuracy. Our research identifies the 
important textual and financial variables that impact 
the severity of the attacks and determine that 
different antecedents influence risk level and 
potential financial loss associated with phishing 
attacks.  
Key Words: Phishing, Data Mining, Financial loss, 
Risk, Text Mining, Variable Importance. 
 
Introduction 
Phishing is a major security threat to the online 
community. It is a kind of identity theft that makes 
use of both social engineering skills and technical 
subterfuge to entice the unsuspecting online 
consumer to give away their personal information 
and financial credentials [1]. Phishing caused an 
estimated financial loss of US $3.2 billion affecting 
3.6 million people from September 2006 to August 
2007, showing its tremendous financial impact [2]. 
Phishing attacks not only cause financial loss, but 
also shatter the confidence of customers in 
conducting e-commerce. A recent survey found that 
most customers of European banks only use online 
banking to check their account balances instead of 
conducting online transactions due to the fear of 
getting phished [3]. Another study also reported that 
the customer fear psychosis has resulted in a 20% 
decrease in the rate of opening of genuine emails [4]. 
To make customers aware of latest phishing attacks, 
some international organizations, such as Anti-
phishing Working Group (APWG) and Millersmiles, 
and government statutory bodies have published 
phishing alerts on their respective Web sites. Apart 
from contextual information such as apparent sender, 
return email address, content of phishing email, URL 
of phishing server, and location of phishing location, 
an anti-phishing Web site Millersmiles has 
announced the associated risk level of phishing 
attacks and provided security advice to the general 
public. However, the risk level, which is based on the 
technical sophistication of phishing attacks, may not 
be directly related to financial loss caused by an 
attack based on past research [5]. The financial loss 
resulting from a phishing attack is always of great 
concern to security administrators, investors and 
consumers of an organization. In fact, both risk level 
and indirect financial loss are complementary 
measures because the two indicators may not be 
correlated and a high risk level of a phishing alert 
does not necessarily imply that the phishing attack 
will result in a high loss in market value [5]. 
Therefore, assessing the severity of phishing alerts 
using both these indicators helps to build a complete 
picture of the impact of phishing attacks. 
This research has several objectives. By 
analyzing data related to phishing alerts using data 
mining techniques, we aim to identify the key 
characteristics of phishing attacks that determine the 
risk level of phishing attacks. Secondly, we predict 
the magnitude of loss in the market value of a firm 
when it is targeted by phishers. Since direct financial 
loss due to a phishing attack is difficult to calculate, 
we look into indirect financial loss in market value 
caused by phishing alerts.  
 
Literature Review 
Phishing has aroused great interest among 
information security researchers. Understanding the 
critical success factors of phishing and determining 
methods that can prevent or detect such a crime has 
been a popular area of research. We can roughly split 
current research on phishing into three streams, 
namely, phenomenal studies, economic analysis, and 
technical research. 
As an example of a phenomenal study 
related to phishing, Jagatic et al. found that the social 
engineering skill of the adversary was a critical 
success factor for phishing [6]. Workman found that 
the critical success factors for some marketing 
strategies were applicable to phishing attacks as well 
[7]. Researchers also found that education of 
customers, standardization of technology, and 
sharing of phishing information were among the 
most important policies that could deter phishing 
attacks [8].  
Among economic studies related to phishing, 
Singh studied a number of international phishing 
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incidents and found that the direct financial loss per 
incident ranged from US$900 to 6.5 million pounds 
[9]. However, it is widely believed that as companies 
are quite reluctant to disclose information related to 
direct financial loss caused by phishing, the actual 
financial loss might be ten times more than the 
estimated numbers that appeared in research reports 
[10]. In their attempt to estimate the indirect financial 
loss caused by phishing, Leung and Bose found that 
phishing related announcements caused a significant 
negative reaction among investors of targeted 
companies [5]. It is interesting to note that a 
significant negative investor reaction of 2.1% loss in 
market value within two days of the announcement 
was reported in the broader context of analyzing the 
economic impact of information security breaches 
[11]. 
In the area of technical research, 
information security researchers have toiled to 
discover better countermeasures of phishing. Data 
mining techniques have been used to filter out 
phishing emails that contained fraudulent messages 
[12]. By analyzing the headers of emails, researchers 
were able to prevent the spread of malicious emails 
containing virus/worms/Trojans and stop crimes such 
as phishing and distributed denial of service attacks 
with an accuracy of 99% [13]. To authenticate the 
URL embedded in the emails, logistic regression [14] 
and decision trees have also been used [15].  
Text mining has also gained popularity as a 
research tool due to its ability to mine digital content 
available on the Internet. The most typical 
application of text mining is in document 
management involving tasks such as text 
segmentation, key words extraction, indexing, and 
text categorization. Wei et al. have used clustering 
techniques and integrated information on personal 
preferences for document management [16]. A hybrid 
methodology that combined text mining with data 
mining has been adopted by some researchers as well. 
Ma et al. used text mining to analyze company news 
and discover social networks among companies and 
utilized the discovered characteristics of the social 
networks to predict the revenue of the associated 
companies using decision trees and logistic 
regression [17]. Although text mining has been 
frequently used in a number of domains, its 
application in the area of information security is not 
so common. Wang et al. used text mining to analyze 
disclosures about information security incidents in 
financial reports and determined if they impacted the 
valuation of the firm [18]. We believe that text 
mining techniques can be used to analyze text-based 
phishing alerts in the same way for identification of 
important textual variables that characterize phishing 
attacks.  
Prior research has demonstrated that 
phishing as an online crime is growing in terms of 
frequency of occurrences, financial loss imparted to 
firms and their customers, as well as technical 
sophistication.  As there is a lack of research in the 
area of assessment of phishing attacks, we are 
motivated to construct a warning system based on a 
knowledge based approach. In the context of security 
breaches, past research has evaluated the impact of 
the characteristics of the attack on the financial loss 
generated by the security breach [11,19] but did not 
find any significant relationship between them.  
 
Data Collection and Analysis 
In this section we describe how we collect, prepare, 
and analyze phishing alerts to assess their severity 
and determine important antecedents that influence 
the classification.  
Data Collection and Preparation 
To determine the severity of phishing attacks, we 
utilized phishing alerts available from the database 
Millersmiles and financial data available from the 
financial statements of the firms. The phishing alerts 
data used in this research is the largest available data 
at the time of research and was collected from mid-
2005 to mid-2008.  
As phishing is primarily motivated by 
financial gains, corporate financial data may be 
relevant for the assessment of severity of phishing. 
Relevant financial data that was reported in the last 
month of the year prior to the release of the phishing 
alert was retrieved from The Center for Research in 
Security Prices. In the raw dataset, there were 168 
financial variables. The authors conferred with each 
other and an expert in the area of finance to choose 
relevant financial variables that were appropriate for 
the context of this research. This resulted in the 
choice of 75 attributes related to the financial 
performance of a firm. Then we used the Pearson’s 
Chi-square statistic to determine the strength of the 
relationship between those 75 financial variables and 
the target variables. The top 25 variables for the 
classification tasks (in terms of the Pearson’s Chi-
square statistic) were selected. The list of those 25 
financial variables appears in Table 1. As some 
targets of phishing attacks did not have publicly 
available financial data, (e.g., Internal Revenue 
Service) some sample data was discarded at this 
stage. 
 
Table 1. List of Financial Data 
 
The technical sophistication of the phishing attack 
was measured in terms of the risk level of the attack 
that was determined by the information security 
specialists of Millersmiles. As for financial impact, 
an event study was conducted to determine the 
change in market value of the firm after the release of 
the phishing alert, similar to the research done by 
Leung and Bose [5]. First, all events related to  
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Variables Mean Std. Dev 
Advertising_Expense 528.41 639.80 
Assets_Total 65481.96 130713.00
Book_Value_Per_Share 24.61 30.93 
Common_Equity_Tangible 14641.81 19161.09 




Interest_and_Taxes 10021.76 11791.06 
Employees 61.20 113.79 
Income_Before_ 
Extraordinary_Items 4262.38 5304.67 
Inventories_Total 7679.02 20266.69 
Invested_Capital_Total 86918.49 111025.53
Liabilities_Total 453071.57 635203.23
Long_Term_Debt_Total 60586.83 86909.57 
Market_Value_Total_Fiscal 47621.20 56221.96 
Net_Income_Loss 4271.03 5330.99 
Notes_Payable_Short_Term 
_Borrowings 45027.88 94363.77 
Operating_Expenses_Total 20771.45 27889.17 
Other_Intangibles 3281.63 6536.10 
Preferred_Preference_Stock_
Capital_Total 407.25 1033.62 
Price_High_Annual_Fiscal 51.19 21.34 
Price_Low_Annual_Fiscal 35.90 16.60 
Receivables_Total 244662.65 317712.00
Revenue_Total 31582.61 38778.60 
S_P_Core_Earnings 4212.09 5058.42 
Selling_General_and_ 
Administrative_Expense 7645.00 8144.54 
 
private firms were removed. Then events that were 
affected by some confounding events such as 
mergers, acquisitions, dividend announcements, and 
changeovers were eliminated from further 
consideration. Then the stock return of the firm was 
compared with that of a market index to determine 
the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of stock 
prices of firms due to the release of the phishing alert. 
We used CAR in this study because the change in the 
stock price of a firm is a synthesized reflection of 
various consequences due to phishing attacks, such 
as loss of clients, shrinkage in market share, and 
reduced confidence of consumers as well as investors.  
A total of 1,030 phishing alerts in our sample data 
had relevant CAR data and were subsequently used 
for classification of risk level and CAR. The CAR for 
these 1,030 phishing alerts ranged from -7.9% to 
5.7% with an average of 0% and standard deviation 
of 1.3%.  
Numerical Experimentation  
We used a 3×3×2 experimental design in this 
research incorporating three sets of input data, three 
classifiers, and two classification tasks. The design 
included: 
 Textual data from phishing alerts, financial data 
of the targeted companies, and combined textual 
and financial data. Text mining techniques were 
used on the phishing alerts to determine 
important semantic concepts that could act as 
input variables to the classifiers. 
 Three classifiers – decision trees (DT), support 
vector machines (SVM), and neural networks 
(NN). 
 Classification of risk level and CAR.  
After the models were built, their performances were 
compared using top decile lift as performance metric. 
In addition, we also evaluated the relative importance 
of the different input variables for the various models. 
Further details about the experimental design are 
provided in the following sub-sections. 
Textual Content Analysis Using Text Mining 
Text mining was used to convert free text of the 
phishing alerts to structural data in the form of a 
document-term matrix. We grouped similar terms 
together so that the dimensionality of the document-
term matrix was significantly reduced. In fact, we 
found that some of the frequently occurring words 
had almost similar meaning and thus it was more 
efficient to group such words together under a higher 
level concept. For example, the terms ‘cash’, ‘refund’, 
and ‘savings’ could be grouped under the concept  
‘money’.  
Usually, a dictionary which contained the linguistic 
and semantic relationships between words is used for 
grouping of concepts. We used the text mining 
module of the SPSS Clementine data mining suite to 
extract the key semantic concepts from the phishing 
alerts that had its own built-in dictionary. After 
grouping various terms under the broader semantic 
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concepts, a document-concept matrix was built. Each 
cell of the matrix represented the frequency of 
occurrence of the concepts within a document (i.e., a 
phishing alert). By performing this analysis, the 
natural language of phishing alerts was converted to 
structural data that could be used as input variables to 
the classification models.  
Development of Classification Models for Risk 
Level and CAR  
We first categorized phishing alerts according to the 
risk level assigned by Millersmiles. There were 
several predefined risk levels, namely, Low, Low-
Medium, Medium, Medium-High, and High. For the 
sake of simplicity, we grouped risk levels Low and 
Low-Medium to form a new group ‘Low’ and 
Medium-High and High to form a new group ‘High’. 
Next, we categorized phishing alerts according to the 
CAR generated by them. Positive CAR indicated that 
the market responded favorably to the phishing alert 
whereas a negative CAR indicated unfavorable 
market response. Although CAR is a continuous 
variable we categorized it into three groups, namely, 
positive, stable, and negative. The positive group 
consisted of phishing alerts that resulted in CAR 
greater than 3%, while the negative group consisted 
of phishing alerts associated with a CAR less than -
3%. This method of creating groups with the choice 
of 3% as a threshold value was also used in prior 
research [18].   
In the subsequent modeling phase, we classified risk 
level and CAR using input variables obtained from 
textual categories or financial data or both. NN, SVM, 
and DT were used in this research due to their history 
of superior performance in other applications related 
to information security [15]. The three classifiers 
have different characteristics. NN consists of three 
inter-connected layers, namely, input layer, hidden 
layer, and output layer. Each layer contains 
interconnected nodes than can process the data. The 
interconnections are assigned weights that continue 
to change as the NN ‘learns’ the pattern from the 
input data. Because of the structure, NN is good at 
learning non-linear relationships between input data 
and output data. SVM views data sets as vector 
spaces and performs classification by constructing a 
hyperplane that maximizes the separation in order to 
divide the vectors into different classes. SVM can 
perform either linear or non-linear classification. DT 
can tolerate the presence of outliers and missing data 
and so minimum effort is required for data 
preprocessing using DT. When processing 
categorical data with more than two levels of value, 
NN and SVM create dummy variables for each level 
of value of the related input variable, and this adds to 
the computational burden. In contrast, DT can derive 
rules directly from categorical data without creating 
dummy variables. However, DT cannot use 
continuous variables directly and has to convert them 
to categorical data. The DT model adopted in this 
research was C5.0.  
The risk levels and the CAR for the phishing alerts 
were not evenly distributed. Table 2 shows the 
distributions of the two variables. Therefore, for 
classification of risk level, we oversampled the high 
risk and low risk instances of data but kept the 
medium risk instances the same so that the 
distribution of the three groups became 1:1:1 in the 
training and testing data sets. For classification of 
CAR, we repeated the process by oversampling the 
negative and positive instances while retaining the 
stable instances in its original form. To build the 
classification model, 70% of the oversampled data 
was used for training and 30% was used for testing. 
However, in the validation data sets, we retained the 
original distribution of data. We also used 10-fold 
cross validation and calculated the average accuracy 








Category Count Proportion 
Risk Level   
High 86 8.37% 
Low 23 2.24% 
Medium 919 89.45 
CAR   
Negative 24 2.33% 
Positive 28 2.72% 
Stable 978 94.95% 
 
Results 
In this section, the results obtained by applying the 
trained classification models on the validation data 
are presented. We evaluated the decile lift of the 
models and then identified the important variables 
discovered by the models for the two classification 
tasks.  
Decile Lift 
In Tables 3 and 4, we showed the lift values obtained 
for the two classification tasks. For classification of 
risk level, the models assigned likelihood scores to 
phishing alerts that indicated how likely it was for 
the phishing alerts to be high risk. The top decile lift 
was equal to the ratio of true high risk phishing alerts 
among the top 10% of phishing alerts in terms of the 
likelihood score of high risk divided by the ratio of 
high risk phishing alerts in the whole population of 
phishing alerts. The higher the top decile lift, the 
better was the model. We used lift values to compare 
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the model’s ability to capture high risk phishing 
alerts. As shown in Table 3, the combined textual and 
financial data always performed best in terms of top 
decile lift up to the 7th decile. For SVM, the use of 
only textual data was consistently better than the use 
of only financial data in terms of top decile lift. For 
DT, the performance using textual data was not as 
good as that using financial data in the first decile but 
was consistently better up to the 6th decile and for 
NN the performance using textual data was better 
than that using financial data up to the 4th decile. The 
results indicated that analyzing the textual content of 
the phishing alerts was important for the 
classification of risk levels of the phishing alerts. The 
results also illustrated that combining textual data 
with financial data made the classification more 
accurate. Among the three classifiers, the 
performance of SVM was the best for the top decile. 
The top decile lift of the SVM classification model 
using hybrid textual and financial data as inputs was 
6.40. This meant that this particular model was 6.4 
times more likely to capture true high risk phishing 
alerts than random selection.  
 
 
Table 3. Lift Values for Classification of Risk Level 

















1 5.26  4.07  4.09  6.40  4.40 2.44 4.77  4.19  2.75 
2 4.35  3.17  2.98  3.95  3.52 1.82 3.49  3.07  2.51 
3 3.02  2.50  2.40  2.91  2.54 1.98 2.55  2.36  1.97 
4 2.33  2.02  1.99  2.31  2.00 1.76 2.06  1.80  1.69 
5 1.93  1.73  1.70  1.93  1.75 1.52 1.67  1.51  1.58 
6 1.61  1.55  1.50  1.61  1.59 1.37 1.47  1.38  1.46 
7 1.38  1.35  1.38  1.43  1.38 1.24 1.28  1.24  1.33 
8 1.21  1.24  1.25  1.25  1.21 1.16 1.13  1.15  1.18 
9 1.11  1.11  1.11  1.11  1.11 1.09 1.06  1.06  1.07 
10 1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 1.00 1.00  1.00  1.00 
Table 4. Lift Values for Classification of CAR 

















1 5.91  4.76  2.90 8.52  7.72 2.86 7.62  7.14  5.63  
2 3.10  2.75  2.86 4.76  5.00 4.03 4.76  4.29  4.07  
3 2.75  2.70  2.68 3.17  3.33 3.17 3.17  3.17  3.17  
4 2.38  2.20  2.50 2.50  2.50 2.50 2.38  2.38  2.50  
5 2.00  2.00  2.00 2.00  2.00 2.00 2.00  2.00  2.00  
6 1.67  1.67  1.67 1.67  1.67 1.67 1.67  1.67  1.67  
7 1.43  1.43  1.43 1.43  1.43 1.43 1.43  1.43  1.43  
8 1.25  1.25  1.25 1.25  1.25 1.25 1.25  1.25  1.25  
9 1.11  1.11  1.11 1.11  1.11 1.11 1.11  1.11  1.11  
10 1.00  1.00  1.00 1.00  1.00 1.00 1.00  1.00  1.00  
The lift values obtained for the classification of CAR 
are shown in Table 4. The results shown are 
consistent with those in Table 3. Again, the combined 
textual and financial data performed best in terms of 
lift in most cases and the use of only textual data was 
better than the use of only financial data for SVM but 
not for DT and NN. Table 4 again illustrated the 
importance of combining textual data with financial 
data for the purpose of classification. As in the case 
of risk level classification, the SVM model using 
combined textual and financial data as inputs 
obtained the highest lift value of 8.52.  
 
Comparison of Important Variables  
In order to understand the antecedents that governed 
the classification of risk level and CAR of phishing 
alerts, we calculated the importance of all input 
variables. As the combined textual and hybrid data 
gave rise to good decile lift in general, we listed the 
top five most important textual variables and the top 
five most important financial variables identified for 
each of the classification tasks using the three 
classifiers with this data as input. The variables are 
listed in order of their importance in Tables 5 and 6 
where the column ‘Identifying Classifier(s)’ showed 
which classifiers rated the variable as a top five 
variable.   
We can observe that there was no general agreement 
among the classifiers about the most important 
textual category. For classification of risk level, 
‘update’ was identified as an important textual 
category by all three classifiers. This implied that 
phishing attacks with messages requesting recipients 
to update their personal information were of high risk 
level. For classification of CAR, ‘consumers’ was 
identified as an important textual category by all 
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three classifiers whereas ‘information’ and ‘writing’ 
were identified as top five categories by two of the 
three classifiers. When phishers pretended to be 
authenticated service providers and requested their 
customers to reveal personal information, then such 
attacks became likely to cause financial loss to the 
customers, hurt brand reputation, and affect present 
and future revenues of the company.  
Table 5. Textual Concepts Listed in Order of 












Security DT, SVM Information DT, SVM 
Email DT, SVM Writing SVM, NN 
Bank 
account DT, NN eBay DT 
Bank SVM, NN Confirmation DT 
Confirm
ation DT Warning DT 
Account SVM Person SVM 
Informat
ion NN Account SVM 
Compute
rs NN Work NN 
  Computers NN 
  Assets NN 
*Textual concepts common to both classifications are 
shown in italic 
In Table 6, the top five most important financial 
variables identified by the three classifiers are listed. 
There were no common financial variables for 
classification of risk level and CAR. This showed 
that the underlying financial variables determining 
the two measures of severity of phishing attacks were 
significantly different. For classification of risk level, 
total of inventories was identified as an important 
financial variable by all three classifiers whereas 
other intangibles and advertising expense was 
identified as a top five financial variable by two out 
of three classifiers. These financial variables 
indicated the preference of phishers towards 
launching attacks on large firms. High total 
inventories and intangibles is a hallmark of a large 
firm and high advertising expense identified a 
company that had greater media exposure. This 
meant that large companies were preferred targets for 
high risk phishing attacks because they had a strong 
customer base and their customers were likely to be 
misled by fake emails due to their inherent trust on 
these companies. For classification of CAR, number 
of employees, total invested capital, and total 
liabilities were identified as top five financial 
variables by two out of three classifiers. Again, the 
number of employees and total invested capital 
indirectly hinted at the large size of the firm. It was 
interesting to note that firms that already had high 
total liabilities were at greater risk of being penalized 
by investors when phishing attacks took place and 
shook the confidence of the investors.
 
Table 6. Financial Variables Listed in Order of Importance with Identifying Classifiers 
Risk level Identifying  Classifier(s) CAR 
Identifying  
Classifier(s) 
Inventories_Total DT, SVM, NN Employees DT, SVM 
Other_Intangibles DT, NN Invested_Capital_Total SVM, NN 
Advertising_Expense SVM, NN Liabilities_Total SVM, NN 
Price_High_Annual_Fiscal DT Receivables_Total DT 
Operating_Expenses_Total DT Net_Income_Loss DT 
Income_Before_Extraordinary_Items DT Price_Low_Annual_Fiscal DT 
S_P_Core_Earnings SVM Long_Term_Debt_Total DT 
Preferred_Preference_Stock_Capital_Total SVM Assets_Total SVM 
Market_Value_Total_Fiscal SVM Book_Value_Per_Share SVM 
Common_Equity_Tangible NN Notes_Payable_Short_Term_Bors. NN 
Earnings_Before_Interest_and_Taxes NN Debt_in_Current_Liabilities_Total NN 
  Cost_of_Goods_Sold NN 
 
Discussion 
Keeping in mind that it is important to evaluate the 
technical sophistication as well as the potential 
financial impact of phishing attacks, we conducted 
this research and developed a mechanism to predict 
the severity of phishing alerts in terms of risk level 
and potential loss in market share indicated by CAR 
of stock prices. From the list of top five most 
important input variables generated using the three 
classifiers, we found that the overlap for the two 
types of classifications was consistently low and this 
implied that risk level of a phishing alert was not 
indicative of the CAR generated by it. The loss in 
market value of the targeted firm could be added 
with the information of the risk level by anti-phishing 
organizations to give a complete picture of the 
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impact of a phishing attack. Furthermore, our 
research results indicated that assessment based on 
data that consisted of important textual categories 
discovered from the text of phishing alerts as well as 
financial data of the targeted companies, 
outperformed assessment based on any of the above 
data items alone. Information security specialists 
usually assess risk level of phishing incidents based 
on the textual description of phishing alerts. Our 
results indicated that for assessing severity it was 
important to consider the financial condition of the 
targeted company as well.  
From an academic perspective, our research made an 
important contribution in terms of application of a 
hybrid text and data mining method for solving a 
problem in the area of information security. Text 
mining was used in the first stage to extract key 
semantic concepts from the textual content of the 
phishing alerts. The performance of the classifiers in 
terms of top decile lift showed that the hybrid text 
and data mining model was successful in classifying 
different levels of risks and different types of 
financial impact caused by phishing attacks. The 
results were more or less consistent for the three 
different classifiers and indicated that a hybrid data 
mining model was able to generate consistent results 
of high accuracy. Data mining techniques have been 
frequently used in the past to filter out phishing 
emails or thwart access to phishing Web sites and our 
research showed that the same techniques could be 
used to assess severity of phishing attacks effectively.  
From a managerial perspective, our study paved the 
way for automating the assessment of severity of 
phishing attacks. As there are an increasing number 
of phishing incidents that are reported around the 
world every day, manual assessment of such 
incidents could be time consuming as well as 
inaccurate due to the subjective bias of the evaluator. 
The method proposed in this paper automated the 
assessment of phishing incidents using past data and 
provided a richer assessment of such incidents than 
what is currently being done by the anti-phishing 
organizations. We hope that the findings of this study 
can encourage anti-phishing organizations to adopt 
our proposed method to predict the risk level as well 
as potential financial impact of a phishing alert as 
soon as it is reported on their Web site.  
 
Conclusion 
In this research, we adopted a hybrid text and data 
mining model that used text mining to discover 
important semantic categories from the textual 
content of the phishing alerts and combined those 
discovered categories with financial data of the 
targeted companies to come up with classification of 
risk level of the attack and the loss in market value of 
the firm that it was likely to cause. The performance 
of the hybrid model was quite superior in terms of 
top decile lift and demonstrated the need to consider 
textual data as well as financial data for making 
prediction about the severity of the phishing alert. 
Furthermore, our results showed that risk level and 
CAR were fundamentally different from each other 
as we discovered that different textual and financial 
factors impacted them. This implied that it was 
important to evaluate both for fully assessing 
phishing alerts – a practice we recommend that all 
anti-phishing organizations should adopt in future to 
make their members more knowledgeable about the 
severity of phishing attacks.  
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